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The United States has long been regarded as the bastion of free enterprise. Yet the US government is now taking unusual steps: not only is it supporting companies with billions in state funding, it is also buying direct stakes in publicly listed firms. Most recently, Trump announced plans to acquire up to ten per cent of Lithium Americas, the Canadian mining group developing the largest lithium mine in Nevada. This marks a redefinition of American industrial policy. “There is a risk of political and corporate interests becoming entangled,” comments Thorsten Fischer, Managing Director and Head of Portfolio Management at Moventum AM. “For investors, this development represents a new structural risk.”

In a spectacular move, the US government recently secured just under ten per cent of chip giant Intel – a clear signal of the semiconductor sector’s strategic importance in the global contest for technological sovereignty. Washington had previously considered taking a stake in TikTok, while it has already acquired a share in a rare earths producer and secured corporate influence at U.S. Steel through a “golden share” when the company was taken over by Japan’s Nippon Steel. Further investments are under discussion, particularly in defence companies.

Supporters officially justify state involvement as necessary to promote domestic industry and guarantee technological independence. The US wants to remain globally competitive as a driver of innovation and safeguard its supply chains against geopolitical risks. Critics, however, view this new industrial policy as a tightrope walk: “The line between support and intervention is becoming blurred,” says Fischer. “For some, this already tastes of socialism lite.”

Once the state appears as a shareholder, political objectives inevitably move closer to corporate decision-making, even if the shares carry no voting rights. Washington may receive only dividends and no official decision-making powers – yet the signal remains strong. “Every investor knows that political frameworks and ownership structures can shift quickly with future administrations, creating uncertainty in the investment environment,” Fischer explains.

With the state as shareholder, a new risk emerges for investors: corporate decisions may increasingly be shaped by political agendas. This could reduce the appeal of affected stocks and distort competition between companies with and without state backing. Some firms may benefit from cheaper capital, while rivals come under pressure – a two-tier capitalism may emerge.

In the long run, there is also the risk of an innovation trap: “State participation may provide short-term financial stability and secure existing structures,” Fischer notes. “But if companies come to take this security for granted, they could become more risk-averse and act less dynamically.” In this way, the very innovative drive that the US seeks to bolster could be undermined.

There are also concerns that the new US model could find imitators. “If the US deliberately becomes a strategic shareholder in companies it deems essential, politicians in China, Europe or elsewhere will ask: why should we hold back?” says Fischer. This could usher in a new era of industrial-policy interventions, triggering a global race to protect politically favoured sectors. “The risks are real,” Fischer warns. No one yet knows whether Washington’s strategy will secure technological leadership – or lead in the long term to greater state interference, market distortions and obstacles to innovation. “What begins as strategic industrial policy could unleash global dynamics. Pandora’s box may already have been opened,” Fischer concludes.