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The geopolitical battle over semiconductors is no longer a niche industry issue – it is reshaping Europe’s economic cycles. The case of Nexperia shows how small sparks can ignite major economic disruptions. “This is the Senkaku paradox in action,” says Thorsten Fischer, Managing Director and Head of Portfolio Management at Moventum AM. “A single minor intervention can shake entire supply chains.”

For the first time since the Cold War, the Dutch government has invoked emergency legislation to place the Chinese-controlled chipmaker Nexperia under state supervision. The move follows indications of conflicts of interest and asset shifts at its parent company Wingtech, a conglomerate with close ties to Beijing. Washington had already exerted considerable pressure, demanding the replacement of the Chinese CEO. For investors, this step is a wake-up call: governments are increasingly intervening in markets when geopolitical interests are at stake.

“We are witnessing a Cold War reloaded – but this time on an industrial level,” says Fischer. The chip market, once a symbol of global division of labour, has become an arena of state power. The speed of intervention reveals Europe’s growing nervousness. Dependence on China for chips, rare earths and key technologies is now recognised as a strategic risk. For decades, openness was considered a strength. But the tide has turned: “Europe is now paying the price for a decade of complacent acquisition policies by Chinese companies,” Fischer explains.

As Beijing tightens export restrictions on rare earths, the measures hit not only the United States but also strike at the very core of European industries. “Nexperia is literally caught in the crossfire,” says Fischer. “Too Dutch for China, too Chinese for the Netherlands.” This ambivalence has become emblematic of a new geopolitical reality – and a wake-up call for investors who have so far relied on the old logic of globalisation. European car manufacturers such as Volkswagen and Bosch are already warning of shortages and frantically seeking alternative chip sources. “Fears of a politically induced chip shortage are mounting,” Fischer notes. “The industry is on high alert.”

With Dutch elections approaching, Nexperia has also become a symbol of national self-assertion and a test case for how far Europe is willing to go to protect its industrial base. “This decision is more than economic policy,” says Fischer. “It is a signal that Europe is ready to think geopolitically.” For investors, the message is clear: Europe is discovering industrial policy – but belatedly, at high cost, and from a defensive position. “The EU chip plan is lagging behind, the battery future is wavering, and Berlin now needs to lead rather than merely warn,” Fischer stresses. “In the short term, turbulence in the chip and automotive supply chains remains likely – supply chain risks are no longer hypothetical but systemic.”

This shift is also changing the perspective for investors. “In the medium term, it’s worth focusing on companies that benefit from reindustrialisation, resource diversification and rising defence budgets,” says Fischer. In the long run, another trend is emerging: economic security. “Companies that secure critical infrastructure, promote energy independence or develop strategic technologies will be the winners of this new era,” Fischer observes.

“What politicians call sovereignty means, for investors, new cycles, new subsidies – and new opportunities,” Fischer concludes. “The chip battle with China is not a disruption to the economic cycle, but the beginning of a new industrial one. Geopolitical thinking is becoming an integral part of investment strategy. Those who understand the shift from global openness to strategic autonomy are not investing in crises – but in the next era of European value creation.”